Abstract: Additive and multiplicative aggregations of ratio scale preferences are frequently used in multi-criteria decision making models. In this paper, we compare the advantages and limitations of these two aggregation rules by exploring only their fundamental properties after ratio scaled local priorities and criteria weights have been successfully generated from the decision maker. The comparisons of these properties are therefore independent of ancillary procedures such as interactive elicitations from decision makers, pairwise comparisons and calculations of local priorities and criteria weights. We compare six fundamental properties of the two aggregation rules. The criteria weights used in the multiplicative aggregation have complicated meanings which are not well understood and often mixed up in the ambiguous notion of "criteria importance". As the scaling factors of the local preference values do not appear explicitly in the computations of the relative ratios of the overall preferences in the multiplicative aggregation model, the relative ratios remain unchanged when the scaling factors are changed or an alternative is added or deleted. Furthermore, the relative ratios in the multiplicative aggregation do not depend on similar local preference values which cancel each other out mathematically. It is quite evident that the additive aggregation model is superior and easier for decision makers to use and understand. We recommend the additive aggregation rule over the multiplicative aggregation rule.
INTRODUCTION
The basic MCDM problem in most decision making is to evaluate competing alternatives under multiple conflicting criteria. Even though rank ordering (an ordinal scale) of the alternatives is the most common form of solution sought by most decision makers (DM), it is always desirable to know the relative standings of the alternatives measured on a scale containing more information. Valuation on a ratio scale is preferred because it provides the DM with a relative measure of alternatives on each criterion as well as the overall ratio preference across all criteria. A ratio scale measure of overall preference value is also useful for the allocation of resources among all the alternatives. With a ratio scale, it is meaningful to reach conclusions such as "alternative A j is r times preferred to A k relative to all criteria". Additive aggregation and multiplicative aggregation of the local ratio preferences of each alternative into an overall preference are frequently used in multi-criteria decision making models [1] [2] [3] .
In this paper, we compare the advantages and limitations of additive aggregation and multiplicative aggregation rules by exploring their fundamental properties. We do this without investigating the different approaches to ancillary and peripheral procedures such as interactive elicitations from decision makers, pairwise comparisons, and calculations of local priorities and criteria weights. By assuming that local priorities and criteria weights have been correctly derived, we are able to focus on the aggregation procedures. From the comparisons of the fundamental properties presented, it is quite evident that the additive aggregation rule is superior with simpler interpretations which are more readily understood by decision makers.
*Address correspondence to this author at the Faculty of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University, B.C., Canada; E-mail: choo@sfu.ca Fundamental basic elements of the MCDM framework are first depicted without any specific interpretations imposed on these elements. It is assumed that no relevant criterion is missed and each criterion is autonomous. In section 3, the measures of criteria weight, local and overall preferences are assumed to be in ratio scale. Some necessary conditions and the role of normalization are discussed. We then give a brief literature review, with particular attention to the different ancillary procedures and contradicting opinions in model interpretations. Additive and multiplicative aggregation rules are formally introduced in Section 5. In Section 6, we elaborate and compare the fundamental properties of these aggregation rules. Finally, we summarize and give some conclusions.
BASIC ELEMENTS OF MCDM MODEL
The basic elements of a typical MCDM model include a set A={A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n } of n alternatives A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n and a set C={C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C m } of m criteria C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C m . The effect of the criteria C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C m in C is represented by positive numbers w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m respectively. The vector w=[w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m ] is called the criteria weight vector of the criteria C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C m in C. The criteria weight vector w is derived from questioning the DM. The alternatives A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n can be evaluated under each individual criterion C p , p=1,2,…,m. For each criterion C p (p=1,2,…,m), the local preference of the alternatives A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n in A with respect to C p is represented by positive numbers x 1p ,x 2p ,…,x np , respectively. The vector x p =[x 1p ,x 2p ,…,x np ] is called the local preference vector of the alternatives A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n in A with respect to C p . The local preference vectors x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m are derived from questioning the DM.
It is important to note that at this rudimentary level, we only assume that the numerical values in the criteria weight vector w and the local preference vectors x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m exist and are used in MCDM model without stipulating any specific properties, interpretations and restrictions. The properties of the scale of these numerical values and the methods of evaluating them are regarded as additional model assumptions which could vary widely among different models [4, 5] . These numerical values can represent mea-sures in ordinal scale [6] , interval scale [7] or ratio scale [8, 9] . We note that the outranking relationship [10] is not a complete order and thus may not be represented by such numerals directly.
The ultimate goal of all MCDM problems is to aggregate the evaluation of the n alternatives with respect to the m criteria into overall preference measures v 1 To avoid solving the wrong problem, we assume that all relevant criteria are included in C so that no new criterion will be added. To avoid redundancy, we assume that no criterion can be deleted and the criteria in C are disjoint with each other in the sense that no criterion is double counted by another criterion. Each criterion C p (p=1,2,…,m) is assumed to be "autonomous" in the sense that the performance of each alternative A j (j=1,2,…,n) with respect to C p is independent of the other alternatives. In particular, none of the criteria in C is a measure of scarcity, abundance or some ranking of the alternatives in A. It follows that the evaluation of A j (j=1,2,…,n) with respect to C p remains the same regardless of whether any other alternative is deleted or added to A.
In MCDM models, the numerical values in the local preference vectors x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m and the criteria vector w are generated so that they can be aggregated to overall preferences. (
. Unlike addition, multiplication of ratio scales produces a new ratio scale with a different unit of measure.
RATIO SCALE MEASURES AND SCALING FAC-TORS
To be more focused in our investigation, we emphasize on ratio scales that allow both addition and multiplication for aggregation. We assume that the overall preferences v 1 ,v 2 ,…,v n exist in ratio scale such that A j is v j /v k times preferred to A k , 1 j,k n. The overall preference vector v=[v 1 ,v 2 ,…,v n ] is unique up to a positive scaling constant and we write v= [u 1 ,u 2 ,…,u n ] where can be any positive number. The relative ratios of v 1 ,v 2 ,…,v n constitute the overall results sought in the model without any specific unit of measure. For convenience, we use the normalization constraint v 1 +v 2 +…+v n =1 to get rid of and specify the overall preference values.
For each criterion C p (p=1,2,…,m), we assume that the local preferences x 1p ,x 2p ,…,x np exist in ratio scale such that A j is x jp /x kp times preferred to A k under C p , 1 j,k n. Since the relative ratios x jp /x kp (1 j,k n) are uniquely determined by the values in the local preference vector x p =[x 1p ,x 2p ,…,x np ] which can be arbitrarily scaled by any positive constant, we write x p = p [y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np ] where p is a positive number. We note that, even when there exists original natural measurement for the performance of A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n under C p , the local preference values x 1p ,x 2p ,…,x np need not have linear functional relationship with these natural measurements. However, if the local preference values are expressed in well established unit of measure u (e.g. u=$1,000 or u=kg), then we write x p = p u[y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np ]. As 1 , 2 ,…, m are arbitrary positive numbers, the values of p y jp and q y jq are arbitrary for criteria C p and C q . In particular, comparing the magnitudes of p y jp and q y jq under different criteria C p and C q is not sufficient because they do not have a common unit of measurement. Also, for each j (j=1,2,…,n), the alternative A j is not fully described by [ 1 y j1 , 2 y j2 ,…, m y jm ] without some knowledge of the units of measure.
We assume that criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m exist in ratio scale such that the weight of C p is w p /w q times the weight of C q , 1 p,q m. The criteria weight vector w=[w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m ] is unique up to a positive scaling constant and we write w= [w 1 ',w 2 ',…,w m '] where can be any positive number. For convenience, we assume that has been chosen such that w 1 +w 2 +…+w m =1.
The scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m and their relationship with the criteria weights have caused much ambiguity and confusion in Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) type models [4, 5, 11, 12] . The local preference values in x p are represented as p u[y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np ] but the role of unit is obscure because the unit of measure u used in measuring the local preference values is usually not explicitly specified and p is an arbitrary positive number. In most AHP type models, 1 , 2 ,…, m are not explicitly shown as arbitrary positive numbers. This obscurity has led to some misunderstanding [12] . A common technique used to determine 1 , 2 ,…, m and hence fixing the numerical values of x p is to impose some artificial normalization constraint such as x 1p +x 2p +…+x np =1. Even though x 1p +x 2p +…+x np =1 is most frequently used, it is not the only one that can be used to specify the scaling constant p . Other normalization constraints such as x jp =1 for some j may be used as in the linking Pin AHP [9] . However, the DM must be aware of the role of the normalization constraint in the questioning procedure of the model. In this paper, we shall show the scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m explicitly in the model development until the units for measuring the local preferences are adequately specified and used in model calculations.
We now give closer scrutiny to the role of scaling constant p by considering the prices in Canadian dollars C$200, C$300 and C$400 of three objects. The prices are represented by p u [2, 3, 4] where u="C$1" and p =100. Prices in different currencies are represented by different p and u which depend on the exchange rate that is applied. For pairwise evaluations of the relative ratios of the prices of these three objects, no particular currency u has to be specified and it is sufficient to use p [2, 3, 4] without specifying p and u is ignored. However, it is impossible to evaluate the impact of the prices of these objects solely from the knowledge of p [2, 3, 4] which captures only the relative ratios of the prices. The knowledge of one of the prices in a known currency is absolutely necessary to recover all the actual prices. It is important to realize the obvious fact that "the relative prices in p [2, 3, 4] " does not contain the crucial information p u=C$100 or "the price of the first object is C$200". p [2, 3, 4] can also represents the relative prices of [C$2,C$3,C$4] and thus it can not be used as a complete representation of [C$200,C$300, C$400]. Put it in another way, p [2, 3, 4] are pure numbers -they do not have complete information in terms of some well established unit of measure. For the derivation of criteria weights, the actual prices are needed to determine the impact of the price attributes on the overall preferences. When the actual prices are unknown, the importance of the actual prices in deriving the criteria weights can be emphasized by p u [2, 3, 4] or u[1,1.5,2] where p =1/2 and u="price of object 1".
Unlike the currencies that are tangible and transparent to the DM, it is more challenging when dealing with local preferences which are intangible measures with no simple choice of p . It is vital to note that p [y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np ] contain the relative ratios only and do not contain the original performances of A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n under C p which are necessary for deriving the overall preferences of A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n . This implies that the pairwise matrices in AHP type models do not contain the crucial information of the original performances necessary for evaluating the alternatives with respect to all criteria. To rectify this, the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m must capture and transform the original performances of A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n under C p , p=1,2,…,m, into overall preferences. This requirement must be clearly stated in the questioning procedures for eliciting the criteria weights from the DM.
In order to focus only on the more fundamental properties of the aggregation rules, we have assumed that all the relevant criteria are already identified and properly formulated. It follows from the autonomy of the criteria that A j is always x jp /x kp time preferred to A k (1 j,k n) with respect to C p regardless of whether any other alternative is deleted or added to A. In this paper, we compare the advantages and limitations of additive and multiplicative aggregation of x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m with w based only on their fundamental mathematical properties. We do not consider the different impacts of numerous distinct methods proposed for the auxiliary problems of deriving the local priorities x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m and the criteria weights in w.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Local preferences under individual criteria are the basic elements used in most MCDM models. The criteria weights are usually modeled in ratio scale which allows an arbitrary positive scaling constant [11] . Local preferences are assumed to be measured in ordinal scale in ranking models [6] , in interval scale in multiple attribute utility models [7] and in ratio scale in AHP type models [8, 9] . There are many methods proposed for deriving local preferences from pairwise comparison matrices [4, 5, [13] [14] [15] [16] . The local preference vectors x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m and the criteria weight vector w are then aggregated into overall preference vector v=[v 1 ,v 2 ,…,v n ] by the additive aggregation [9, 17] or the multiplicative aggregation [2] . Goal programming and data development analysis are also used in some MCDM models [14, 16, 18, 19] . Most of these methods have been extensively analyzed and compared [1, 4, 5, 15, 20] .
There are conflicting viewpoints and disagreements in many aspects of these MCDM models. The criteria weight w p can have many different interpretations. It is problematic when the generic term "criteria weight of importance" is used in questioning the DM without explaining its specific intended meaning. The criteria weights in w elicited from the DM may not be consistent with the associated mathematical operations used in the model [11, 12] . The local preferences x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x m are subjective evaluations from the DM with reference to the performance of the alternatives under individual criteria. Even when there are convenient original performance measures of the alternatives such as the prices in dollars, the subjective local preferences need not be linearly related. To simplify these subjective evaluations, different discrete intensity scales of 1-9 with verbal judgment are framed in different models for the DM to select one of the preference intensities [2, 17] . There is also disagreement on the validity of rank preservation of alternatives after some alternative is added or deleted [3, 21] . Another disagreement is whether additive or multiplicative aggregation is the better way to aggregate [22] . In the remainder of this paper, we compare the fundamental properties of the additive and multiplicative aggregation rules for ratio scales MCDM.
ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE AGGREGA-TION RULES
In Additive aggregation model, the overall preferences v 1 
The scaling constants 1 , 2 ,…, m are included in (1) and (2) to show their impact, or lack thereof, on the overall preferences explicitly. While 1 , 2 ,…, m must be explicitly specified in (1), it will be shown later that 1 , 2 ,…, m can be deleted in (2) with no change in the relative ratios of g 1 ,g 2 ,…,g n . However, since 1 , 2 ,…, m are associated to units of measure, they must be known and specified before determining the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m .
Mathematically, there is a one-one correspondence between the result f=[f 1 ,f 2 ,…,f n ] from the additive model and the result of the multiplicative model applied to the exponentially transformed local preferences. Specifically, by taking exponential of (1) 
Thus the additive overall preference vector f=[f 1 ,f 2 ,…,f n ] can be derived from the equations in (3) which is the multiplicative aggregation of the exponentially transformed local preferences. Thus, the same answer can be derived from (1) and (3). In similar fashion, the multiplicative overall preference vector g=[g 1 ,g 2 ,…,g n ] in (2) can be derived from (4) ln(g j ) = w 1 ln( 1 y j1 ) + w 2 ln( 2 y j2 ) + ..... + w m ln( m y jm ), j = 1,2,...,n (4) Thus the result of the additive model can be obtained from the multiplicative model and vice versa. However, the additive and multiplicative aggregation models in equations (1) and (2) yield different results for the same data. Accordingly, they are regarded as different MCDM models, particularly due to the many very different interpretations of the intermediate terms w p x jp , x jp^( w p ) and the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m . This leads to the need for different questioning procedures to match the associated mathematical operations used in each model and different instructional protocols to ensure that the questioning procedures are well understood by the DM [1, 9] .
FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE AGGREGATION RULES
We now consider the fundamental properties (FP) of the additive model (FPA) and the multiplicative model (FPM). These properties are not affected by ancillary peripheral procedures such as interactive elicitations from decision makers, pairwise comparisons, and calculations of local priorities and criteria weights. The right hand side of (1) is the sum of w 1 1 y j1 , w 2 2 y j2 ,…,w m m y jm which are ratio scale measurements in commensurate units of overall preferences. Thus the w 1 1 y j1 , w 2 2 y j2 ,…,w m m y jm components can be regarded as partial values in overall preference units. The partial value w p p y jp represents the portion of the overall preference of A j contributed from the criterion C p . The estimated overall preference f j of A j is the sum of all these partial values.
(FPM1) In the multiplicative model, it is difficult to interpret ( p y jp )^w p , p=1,2,…,m.
The right hand side of (2) is a product of complicated terms which have no tractable units of measure. The contribution of A j under C p is not explicitly identified in (2) . As factors of a product, the ( 1 y j1 )^w 1 , ( 2 y j2 )^w 2 The local preferences 1 y j1 , 2 y j2 ,…, m y jm are converted to partial values w 1 1 y j1 ,w 2 2 y j2 ,…,w m m y jm . These partial values are in commensurate units and sum to f j which is an estimation of the overall preference v j of A j . The criteria weights depend on the performances of the n alternatives with respect to each of the m criteria. When p is specified by imposing the normalization constraint p y 1p + p y 2p +…+ p y np =1 as in the conventional AHP [11, 17] , then w p =w p p y 1p +w p p y 2p +…+w p p y np represents one unit equivalence of local preference in C p measured in units of overall preference. This is a difficult concept because it may not be easy to conceive an alternative (real or imaginary) that achieves a local preference of p y 1p + p y 2p +…+ p y np =1 under C p . When p y jp =1 is imposed to specify p as in Linking Pin AHP [9] , then w p =w p p y jp represents the equivalence of the performance of A j in C p measured in units of overall preference.
(FPM2) In the multiplicative model, there is no simple interpretation for criteria weights.
It is difficult to interpret ( p y jp )^w p in (2) . The criteria weight w p , used as an exponent, does not have any direct apparent practical interpretation.
Looking at the logarithmic transformed values of (2) as given in (4), it is clear that the criterion weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m are the conversion factors that convert the logarithmic transformed values of local preferences ln( 1 y j1 ),ln( 2 y j2 ),…,ln ( m y jm ) into partial values w 1 ln( 1 y j1 ),w 2 ln( 2 y j2 ),…,w m ln ( m y jm ). These partial values are in commensurate units and sum to ln(g j ). However, it is much more complicated than the conversion factors in the additive model due to the logarithmic transformation. The units of measure for local preferences must be specified before they can be meaningfully converted to units of overall preferences. The local preferences 1 y j1 , 2 y j2 ,…, m y jm are specified by fixing the unit of measure via 1 , 2 ,…, m with some normalization constraints. Then the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m , as conversion factors, can be meaningfully elicited from the DM. We note that after w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m are determined, the normalization constraint and the scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m can not be arbitrarily changed without altering the unit of measure of the local priorities. If a different normalization constraint is used and p is changed to p ', then the criteria weight w p must be adjusted to w p '=w p p / p ' to maintain the same results generated from the original units. Otherwise, unwarranted rank reversals may occur [12] . on the right hand side of (2a) is a common factor which can be deleted in the ratios g j /g k , 1 j,k n. The relative ratios of g 1 ,g 2 ,…,g n are unchanged when the scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m and the normalization constraints are changed. The criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m are dependent on the actual performances underlying the local preference values. This is easily neglected since 1 , 2 ,…, m do not appear explicitly in the expressions for the relative ratios g j /g k (j,k=1,2,…,n). The DM is usually asked to provide w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m as "relative criteria importance" without additional guidance. Even though it is complicated, correct guidance can be discerned from equation (4) and the criteria weights are converting factors that convert the logarithm of local priorities into commensurate units. For each criterion C p (p=1,2,…,m), x p = p u[y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np ] where y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np are some specified local preferences under C p , p is a positive number and u specifies an unit of measure if available. Let t p be a typical value of all local preferences y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np under C p . In practice, t p is some standard value or aspiration value elicited from the DM or, it may simply be the median or average of y 1p ,y 2p ,…,y np . By imposing the normalization constraint p t p =1, we can say that w p =w p p t p is the amount of overall preference equivalent to a typical local preference under C p . Interpreted as the contribution of a typical local preference, w p can be regarded as a measure of criteria importance of C p [11] It is conceivable that the DM can compare two (real or imaginary) alternatives which differ only in one criterion C p and provide jk as an estimated value of g j /g k . Then w p is approximately ln( jk )/ln(y jp /y kp ). This provides a method for deriving criteria weights from the original performance of alternatives. It can also be used to check the validity of the model results. Unfortunately, there is no apparent insightful interpretation for ln( jk )/ln(y jp /y kp ). However, the huge difference between the magnitudes 8 and 1 under C 1 is expected to have significant impact as in (FPA5) rather than absolutely no impact in (FPM5).
(6) Addition or Deletion of Alternative
(FPA6) In the additive model, if the values of 1 , 2 ,…, m are specified by the normalization x 1p +x 2p +…+x np =1 (p=1,2,…,m), then the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m need to be adjusted when some alternative is added or deleted in order to maintain commensurability. If linking pin normalization p y jp =1 is used, the criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m remain unchanged when some alternative is added or some alternative other than the j-th one is deleted.
When an alternative is added or deleted, the terms in the left hand side of the normalization constraint p y 1p + p y 2p +…+ p y np =1 is changed and p attains a new value p '. The partial value of A j under C p is given by w p p y jp and also by w p ' p 'y jp . Thus w p '=w p p / p ' and the criteria weight w p needs to be adjusted to w p '.
(FPM6) In the multiplicative model, the scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m do not appear explicitly in the relative ratio g j /g k . The criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m may remain unchanged when some alternative is added or deleted
The criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m are dependent on the actual performances of the alternatives underlying the local preference values. Adding or deleting an alternative does not alter the perception of the criteria.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The advantages and limitations of the additive and multiplicative aggregation rules are explored and summarized in Table 4 . The additive model has the useful interpretation of w p p y jp as partial value of the performance of A j under C p and the simple interpretation of the criteria weights as conversion factors. Incorporating these interpretations would increase the likelihood that the questioning procedures are better understood by the DM in practice.
The partial values in the additive model are converted by the scaling factors (criteria weights) to commensurate values which are summed to the overall preference values f 1 ,f 2 ,…,f n . For the additive version of the multiplicative model (equation in (4)) the partial values must undergo the logarithmic transformations before conversion by the scaling factors (criteria weights). The implication is that the weights have to be derived differently. In practice, this is not done. Instead, weights are generated in a similar manner for both methods.
The multiplicative adherents [2, 22] criticize the ambiguous criteria weights used in AHP. Yet, they themselves do not pay attention to the wording necessary for the criteria weights in the multiplicative model. In the additive versions of both models, commensurate values must be generated before any addition takes place. The necessity of commensurate units defines the role of criteria weights as conversion factors.
1 , 2 ,…, m do not appear explicitly in the expressions for the relative ratios g j /g k (j,k=1,2,…,n). Thus the relative ratios are unchanged when the scaling factors 1 , 2 ,…, m and the normalization constraints are changed or some alternative is added or deleted. However, this leads to the common error of neglecting the actual performances of the alternatives underlying the local preference values in the derivation of criteria weights in the multiplicative model which is misconstrued as an advantage of having fewer elements to manipulate. In actual fact, it is a weakness of the multiplicative model. This is similar to deriving criteria weights w 1 ,w 2 ,…,w m from the prices of three objects given only as [2, 3, 4] without the crucial knowledge of the actual prices [C$200,C$300, C$400]. This means the performances of the alternatives are not fully used in the multiplicative model. Furthermore, it is not logical that the ratio g j /g k is independent of the magnitudes of y jp and y kp when y jp and y kp . are equal or have similar magnitudes. Thus the results of the overall preference values from the multiplicative model are not as credible as the results from the additive model. Also it is more complicated to estimate the criteria weight w p from ln( jk )/ln(y jp /y kp ) (p=1,2,…,m) where jk is elicited from the DM's comparison of two imaginary alternatives which differ only in C p with local preferences p y jp and p y kp .
It is evident that the additive aggregation model, based on the six fundamental properties (FPA1)-(FPA6), is superior insofar as it is effective and easier for the DM to understand and use. Proper interpretations and careful handling of the normalization constraints used in the model are essential elements to be incorporated properly into the questioning procedures. The criteria weights used in the multiplicative aggregation have complicated meanings which are not well understood and often mixed up in the ambiguous notion of "criteria importance". Furthermore, the relative ratios in the multiplicative aggregation do not depend on similar local preference values which cancel each other out mathematically. Thus we recommend the additive aggregation rule over the multiplicative aggregation rule.
